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HUMAN RIGHTS ADRIFT? ENABLING THE DISEMBARKATION OF MIGRANTS TO 





Europe is in the throes of a refugee emergency. To many it will conjure up the image of Alan 
Kurdî, the Syrian three-year-old whose little body washed to shore in Turkey on 2 September 
2015. It is only one of the many human tragedies that take place amidst large flows of 
migrants
1
 trying to reach Europe over sea. An important challenge in this context concerns 
the safe and swift disembarkation of rescued and intercepted migrants to a place of safety. 
Failures to do so are a manifestation of coastal States being unable or unwilling to receive 
migrants on to their territory. Even though the 1974 Convention on the Safety of Life as Sea 
(SOLAS Convention)
2
 and the 1979 International Convention on Maritime Search and 
Rescue (SAR Convention)
3
 have been amended in 2004 with a view to remedying this failure, 
disembarkation remains an unresolved issue. Moreover, commercial vessels are increasingly 
unwilling to pick up migrants exactly because there is no clear guidance on where to 
disembark, which for them leads to financial loss, security risks, and the danger of being 
prosecuted for smuggling activities.  
 
This article scrutinises the legal obligations of EU Member States regarding the 
disembarkation to a place of safety of migrants at sea – directly or indirectly through assisting 
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vessels. It makes the normative claim that specific regional obligations in terms of 
disembarkation arise based on European asylum and human rights law beyond the ambit of 
the International Law of the Sea (LoS). It also questions the compatibility of the current EU 
border control and asylum acquis with the parameters set out in this normative claim. It 
concludes that EU law needs reform in which access, procedural guarantees and burden-
sharing are key, a task that needs to be taken up in light of the current reform of the Common 




Section I sketches the empirical background to the disembarkation problem. Section II briefly 
discusses disembarkation obligations of States under the SOLAS and SAR Conventions to 
illustrate that there exists no residual rule under the LoS determining a State ultimately 
responsible for allowing the disembarkation of migrants.
5
 Section III analyses how European 
human rights law supplements the LoS duty to disembark on to safe territory. Section IV 
discusses the effect on disembarkation of the right to asylum under the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights. It depicts the role of the EU border control and asylum acquis within 
this regime complexity, which is found to be ambiguous and arguably detrimental to the 
human rights of migrants at sea as it stands. Section V concludes by arguing for the need to 
factor in human rights and asylum law for disembarkation and suggests a few elements of 
burden sharing to incentivise EU Member States to accept disembarkations on to their 
territory. 
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I. MIGRANTS AT SEA AND THE PROBLEM OF DISEMBARKATION 
A significant amount of irregular migration towards EU territory takes place over sea.
6
 
Encounters with migrants at sea often occur through extraterritorial border control and search 
and rescue activities of EU Member States or with the assistance of merchant vessels. It is 
often unclear where these migrants should be disembarked, leading to delays and diplomatic 
standoffs. This not only goes to the detriment of the humanitarian conditions of those 
retrieved at sea. It also negatively impacts the willingness of private vessels to rescue 





Three main actors engage with migrants at sea: EU Member States individually, States 
operating jointly (eg with the assistance of Frontex,
8
 under the EU CSDP, or in the 
framework of NATO), and merchant vessels. Concerted efforts – mainly to disrupt smuggling 
routes, but also ‘to save lives at sea’ – have been in practice for a decade now, with the first 
missions focusing on assisting Spain (Operation Hera)
9
 and Malta (Operation Nautilius).
10
 
More recent important operations assisted by Frontex are Operation Triton in Italy and 
Operation Poseidon Sea in Greece, with respective budgets of €38 million and €18 million 
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for 2015 and additional €45 for 2016.
11
 The EU also established the military mission 
EUNAVFOR MED (‘Sophia’) to combat human smuggling and trafficking in the 
Mediterranean. It is fully operational since July 2015
12
 and by September 2015 it had 
participated in nine rescue activities, saving over 1400 lives at sea.
13
 Since February 2016, 
NATO’s Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 started intelligence, surveillance and 





Neither search and rescue practices nor maritime border control are, however, void of 
problems.
15
 Two related types of incidents occur: the lack of rescue
16
 and the lack or delay of 
disembarkation of those rescued (or intercepted) to a place of safety. While the first type of 
issue is not the focus here as such, rescue incidents are often the result of a negative incentive 
structure created by the absence of clear rules and practical options for swift disembarkation. 
Enabling disembarkation is therefore pivotal for the protection of migrants at sea. Although 
the precise frequency of disembarkation incidents is not well-known, some have been 
documented.  
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A first range of examples involves incidents with State vessels. The deployment of Frontex’s 
Operation Nautilius was suspended at some point due to disagreement amongst the 
participating States over the responsibility for the migrants saved at sea.
17
 Under previous 
rules of engagement it was agreed among the participating States that those rescued in the 
Search and Rescue Region (SRR) of Malta would be taken to the closest port, while those 
rescued in the SRRs of third countries would be taken to the ports of the other participating 
EU Member States. According to the Times of Malta, France and Germany wanted to rethink 
these rules of engagement by disembarking all migrants in Malta or in Lampedusa and no 
longer unto their own territory.
18
 Another point in case is the incident of the Marine I in 2007. 
After Spanish coast guards had rescued 300 migrants in the SRR of Senegal, it took two 
weeks of negotiations from the time of the distress call to disembark the migrants in 
Mauritania, which had the closest port of call.
19
 In 2011, more than 100 migrants rescued at 
sea were stuck on a Spanish NATO vessel for several days as Malta, Italy and Spain 
disagreed on where to disembark them. Eventually, the migrants were disembarked in Tunisia 




Standoffs and delays also occur when merchant vessels – both larger vessels and small 
fishing boats – are involved in rescue situations.
21
 For example, incidents occurred with the 
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MV Clementine Maersk in 2005, the MV MS Noordam in 2006 and the Francisco y Catalina 
in 2007.
22
 Another disembarkation incident occurred in 2009 when the MV Pinar E, a 
Turkish cargo ship rescued 154 persons at sea. Italy (whose port of Lampedusa was the 
closest) and Malta (in whose SRR the migrants were picked up) disagreed on where to allow 
disembarkation. Spending more than four days under substandard conditions, the migrants 
concerned were eventually allowed to transfer to an Italian patrol boat to disembark 
subsequently in Italy. The standoff only came to an end after the President of the European 
Commission intervened diplomatically.
23 
Perhaps better known are incidents with smaller 
fishing vessels rescuing migrants at sea and subsequently being denied access to local ports in 
Italy and Malta. In 2008 for instance, two Tunisian fishing vessels (the Fakhreddine 
Morthada and the Mohammed el-Hedi) had rescued migrants at sea and disembarked them to 
Lampedusa despite the refusal of the Italian authorities to grant permission. Seven crew 
members were put on trial for smuggling as a result but were acquitted on appeal.
24
 In 2007 a 
Maltese fishing boat, the Budafel, had migrants clinging onto its tuna pens for three days until 
they were picked up by the Italian coast guard. The captain of the Budafel was unwilling to 
divert his vessel to disembark the migrants because of the potential loss of the tuna catch.25 
Sometimes, private vessels have it as their main purpose to rescue migrants at sea. After 
having carried out a rescue of migrants, the Cap Anamur was refused permission to 
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disembark at the Sicilian port Empedocle. It did so nonetheless after waiting 12 days. The 




II. THE DUTY OF DISEMBARKATION UNDER THE LAW OF THE SEA (LOS) 
Disembarkation forms an integral part of search and rescue at sea, which is regulated under 
three important treaties: the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS),
27
 the 1974 SOLAS Convention, and the 1979 SAR Convention.
28
 As noted in 
the introduction, the SOLAS and SAR Conventions were amended in 2004 to ensure that 
those rescued would be delivered to a place of safety. 
 
A. A place of safety (‘what?’) 
The 2004 amendments create a legal obligation to disembark those rescued at sea to a place 
of safety, but do not define this notion. The 2004 Guidelines on the Treatment of Persons 
Rescued at Sea adopted by the International Maritime Organization (IMO)’s Maritime Safety 
Committee
29
 describe a place of safety as: 
 
‘A location where rescue operations are considered to terminate. It is also a place where the 
survivors’ safety of life is no longer threatened and where their basic human needs (such as food, 
shelter and medical needs) can be met. Further, it is a place from which transportation 
arrangements can be made for the survivors’ next or final destination.’30 
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 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 (entry into force: 16 November 
1994), Vol. 1833 UNTS, 397. 
28
 For a detailed discussion on the search and rescue steps preceding disembarkation in the context of maritime 
migration, see sections 2 & 3 of Campàs Velasco (n 5). 
29
 The Maritime Safety Committee is a subsidiary body of the IMO Council. It has all Member States 
represented and is the IMO’s highest technical body. 
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The IMO Guidelines further suggest that disembarkation needs to be avoided in territories 
where the lives and freedoms of those alleging a well-founded fear of persecution would be 




The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has argued that a place of safety 
should not only refer to the physical protection of people, but also entail the respect for their 
fundamental rights.
32
 The better view is not to read this fundamental rights precision of the 
place of safety notion into the LoS, but rather to conceive them as two distinct but 
complementary obligations.
33
 Indeed, the duty to disembark to a place of safety holds for 
both States and private vessels, while obligations of refugee law and international human 
rights law (IHRL) only bind States.
34
 The IMO Guidelines themselves corroborate the idea 
that human rights protection forms a distinct subject matter, indicating that if other non-SAR 
matters such as dealing with migrants or asylum seekers need to be resolved, this can be done 
once the survivors have been delivered to a place of safety.
35
 Similarly, the 2009 IMO 
Principles Relating to Administrative Procedures for Disembarking Persons Rescued at Sea 
stress that operations and procedures such as screening and status assessment that go beyond 
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B. Venue of disembarkation (‘where?’) 
It does not transpire from the LoS that a place of safety requires the disembarkation on land. 
The IMO Guidelines allow the place of safety to be on a ship. As long as a vessel has the 
appropriate facilities and equipment to sustain additional persons on board without 
endangering its own safety or to care properly for survivors, a vessel can be considered a 
place of safety until the survivors are disembarked to their next destination.
37
 Nonetheless, 
paragraph 6.13 of the IMO Guidelines suggests that those ships should be relieved of that 
responsibility as soon as alternative arrangements can be made. Eventually, the migrants 
rescued will have to be disembarked somewhere on land. Some argue that there exists a right 
of access for vessels to ports to seek refuge because of force majeure, but this customary rule 
is not clearly established, and neither are its parameters in cases involving migrants.
38
 Even 
after the 2004 amendments there still does not exist a residual rule under the LoS pointing out 
a responsible State for allowing the eventual disembarkation on land. Instead, an open-ended 
rule was adopted:  
 
‘The Party responsible for the search and rescue region in which such assistance is rendered shall 
exercise primary responsibility for ensuring such co-ordination and co-operation occurs, so that 
survivors assisted are disembarked from the assisting ship and delivered to a place of safety, taking 
into account the particular circumstances of the case and guidelines developed by the Organization. In 
these cases, the relevant Parties shall arrange for such disembarkation to be effected as soon a 
reasonably practicable.’ (emphasis added)
39
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The 2004 amendment to the SAR Convention also adds a new paragraph 4.8.5, obliging the 
responsible Rescue Co-ordination (Sub)Centre to ‘initiate the process of identifying the most 
appropriate place(s) for disembarking persons found in distress at sea’ and to ‘inform the ship 




Most States have accepted the 2004 amendments, such as Italy, while others like Malta have 
objected to it. Italy interprets it as requiring the SRR State in which the rescue takes place to 
allow disembarkation on its territory.
41
 Malta ‘advocates a “next port of call rule”, mandating 
disembarkation at the nearest safe port to the site of the rescue, which in the Maltese SAR 
area (sic.) is often a port in Italy.’
42
 Other coastal States have taken a reticent stance too on 
the duty to accept disembarkation. For instance, Australia has ‘made clear [its] rejection of 
any legal entitlement to disembark rescued persons at a particular port of a State without the 
consent of that State.’
43
 This was also affirmed in Ruddock v. Vadarlis by the Federal Court 
of Australia in 2001, which held that ‘international law imposes no obligation upon the 




To find a solution for the lasting disembarkation conundrum, the IMO has been in the process 
of adopting non-binding principles.
45
  In 2009, the IMO Facilitation Committee
46
 adopted a 
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 Gallagher and David (n 38) 461. 
44
 Federal Court of Australia, Ruddock v. Vadarlis, Judgment, 18 September 2001, [2001, FCA 1329], §126.  
45
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Circular, Principles Relating to Administrative Procedures for Disembarking Persons 
Rescued at Sea.
47
 These principles state that: 
 
‘if disembarkation from the rescuing ship cannot be arranged swiftly elsewhere, the Government 
responsible for the SAR area (sic.) should accept the disembarkation of the persons rescued in 
accordance with immigration laws and regulations of each Member State into a place of safety under its 
control in which the persons rescued can have timely access to post rescue support.’ (Emphasis 
added)
48
   
 
The advantage of this formulation is that in case no venue for disembarkation can be arranged, 
the SRR State will have to allow disembarkation. This adds to legal certainty for merchant 
vessels and enhances the conditions for those rescued.
49
 These IMO Principles, however, do 
not constitute binding law, and so the problem remains. 
 
Coppens and Somers have studied new discussions on amendments proposed by Spain and 
Italy before the IMO Sub-Committee on Flag State Implementation (now called the ‘Sub-
Committee on Implementation of IMO Instruments’), identifying four major changes.
50
 They 
resemble the IMO Principles adopted by the Facilitation Committee in 2009, but differ in one 
important respect: there is no more reference to the ultimate responsibility of the SRR State to 
allow disembarkation in case no venue is found. In this respect, the proposed Spain/Italy 
amendment is essentially the same as the existing 2004 amendment. Interestingly, Malta also 
submitted an amendment proposal. Instead of affirming the 2009 IMO Principles in putting 
the eventual obligation to allow disembarkation on the SRR State, they formulate that: 
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‘All Contracting Governments involved shall co-operate to ensure that disembarkation occurs in 





Every Contracting State should then have such a safe haven in place: 
 
‘The implementation of such a concept requires that all Contracting Governments undertake to 
provide such a safe haven when so requested by an RCC coordinating a rescue operation, either on 
the basis of geographical proximity or on the basis of its role as first RCC. Such an obligation 
would permit the rapid identification of a place of disembarkation without ambiguity, ensure the 
rapid delivery of rescued persons to a place of safety and ensure minimum disruption to 




This proposal foresees a more clear-cut obligation to disembark, although in a subtle way: the 
next safe port is in principle where those rescued should be disembarked. The clear advantage 
of this proposal is that one can easily and quickly identify a port for disembarkation given the 
geographical realities of each case.
53
 It would also speed up the disembarkation process and 
benefit both merchant vessels as well as the rescued individuals. 
 
In sum, it transpires from the LoS as it currently stands
54
 that there is no residual obligation 
for coastal States to accept disembarkation. It only determines the SRR State’s primary 
responsibility to ensure that coordination and cooperation for disembarkation occurs, but it 
                                                 
51
 Sub-Committee on Flag State Implementation, Measures to Protect the Safety of Persons Rescued at Sea, 
Comments on document FSI 17/15/1 (submitted by Malta), 27 February 2009, FSI 17/15/2, 4, §16 (Malta 
amendment). 
52
 Malta amendment (n 51) §15. 
53
 Coppens and Somers (n 19) 397. 
54
 With regard to the protection of the safety of persons rescued at sea in the Mediterranean, there have been 
new initiatives in the framework of the IMO. A Draft text for a Regional Memorandum of Understanding on 
procedures relating to the disembarkation of persons rescued at sea its target completion year has been 
extended to 2016. 




does not – ultimately – oblige it to accept disembarkation unto its territory.
55
 Under this 
formulation, disembarkation on to territory remains contingent upon the good will of States; 
with potential delays and stand-offs remaining likely.
56
 Moreover, migrants do not derive 
subjective rights in terms of where to be disembarked from this body of international law. 
 
III. THE EFFECT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW ON DISEMBARKATION 
European human rights law obligations accruing at sea affect disembarkation to an important 
degree. Distinct from the duties under the law of the sea, the prohibition of refoulement and 
collective expulsion require disembarkation onto land in order to be complied with.
57
 This 
does not necessarily have to occur on to the territory of the State exercising jurisdiction at sea. 
 
A. Extraterritorial human rights jurisdiction at sea 
Human rights obligations apply extraterritorially when individuals, including migrants, are 
under the jurisdiction of a State. Although this idea is still contested in some areas of the 
world – most notably in Australia
58
 and the United States after the Sale judgment of the U.S. 
Supreme Court,
59
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this doctrine has been affirmed by the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) in several 
landmark decisions. The ECtHR applies mainly three tests to establish extraterritorial 
jurisdiction under Article 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
62
 Under 
the spatial model ‘a State possesses jurisdiction whenever it has effective overall control of 
an area’, while under the personal model ‘a State has jurisdiction whenever it exercises 
authority or control over an individual.’
63
 A third model consists of combining both, ‘with an 




A few ECtHR decisions have refined the personal
65
 model-test in the maritime context. In 
Hirsi Jamaa et al v Italy the Court applied the personal model by referring to the exercise of 
control and authority over an individual.
66
 Moreover, the exercise of effective control is not 
limited to situations in which the State actually takes the migrants on board its own State 
vessel. Indeed, other situations can also amount to effective control. There can be de facto 
control in case of State action on board the other vessel, as was the case in Medvedyev and 
others v France where ‘[the] events in issue took place on board the Winner, a vessel flying 
the flag of a third State but whose crew had been placed under the control of French military 
personnel.’
67
 It is even possible to speak of jurisdiction in circumstances in which a State 
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neither takes individuals on board its vessels, nor goes on board the vessel concerned; one 
does not need to have a case of actual detention of the vessel and/or the people on board. In 
Xhavara et al v Italy, the ECtHR found that Italy, as the flag state of a patrol boat, could be 





While some scenarios thus seem to trigger jurisdiction under the ECHR, other scenarios 
remain unclear, such as using subtler methods like escorting a vessel or using megaphones or 
somehow similarly dissuading vessels from taking a certain course.
69
 Nonetheless, it seems 




A particularly difficult case to determine from a human rights perspective is whether a State 
can exercise jurisdiction over another (merchant) vessel which has reacted to a distress call 
and took migrants on board. This scenario is less clear-cut given that merchant vessels as 
private actors do not have human rights obligations as such. The question then becomes 
whether and how human rights jurisdiction can be established. Is it the flag State of the 
rescuing private vessel which bears the sole responsibility to ensure that human rights are 
respected? Or is it the State in whose Search and Rescue Region the rescuing vessel is 
situated which bears the responsibility?
71
 Can the responsibility for an SRR amount to an 
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‘overall control of an area’ or a ‘background exercise of governmental authority’ where the 
instructions of the SRR’s Rescue Co-ordination Centre constitute control? Does a coastal 
State exercise human rights jurisdiction over a fishing vessel if it refuses that vessel access to 
its port to disembark rescued migrants? 
 
These questions have not yet been fully addressed by the ECtHR. However, in Women on 
Waves v Portugal, the ECtHR found a rights violation on the basis of Portugal refusing entry 
into its territorial waters of the Borndiep: a vessel of Women On Waves
72
 that, once anchored, 
would have been used for meetings and seminars on reproductive health rights.
73
 In casu, the 
Portuguese Secretary for Maritime Affairs issued a decision that prohibited anchoring the 
vessel in its territorial waters. He backed-up his decision with a threat to prosecute on the 
grounds of promoting illegal pharmaceutical products and creating a danger to public 
health.
74
 Moreover, a warship was placed in the vicinity of the Borndiep to prevent it from 
entering Portuguese waters.
75
 At no point in the proceedings before the ECtHR was the issue 
of human rights jurisdiction contested by Portugal. Thus, if preventing passage into territorial 
waters by threatening prosecution and sending warships to prevent entry triggers human 
rights jurisdiction,
76
 one can argue that the same State techniques vis-à-vis merchant vessels 
aiming to disembark migrants does so as well.  
 
Legal-empirical research could enquire as to whether certain maritime areas in the 
Mediterranean Sea are to such an extent under surveillance and characterized by State (vessel) 
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presence that their zonal governance could be qualified as an ‘overall control of an area’ or ‘a 
background exercise of governmental authority’ under the different ECHR models for 
jurisdiction. Cases in point would be maritime areas specifically delineated in operational 
plans of missions aimed at combatting smuggling of migrants and curbing irregular sea 
crossings in the Central and Eastern Mediterranean; operations in which the exchange of 
large amounts of (real-time) data occurs among several actors (EU Member State capacities, 
the EU Border and Coast Guard Agency, NATO capacities, and capacities of third countries) 
based on maritime presence, overflight and satellite images. 
 
Looking into these precise contours of jurisdiction goes beyond the scope of this article.
77
 For 
now it suffices that human rights jurisdiction can be established over migrants at sea under a 
whole range of circumstances and that this may imply disembarkation to a particular territory 
as set out below. It should be stressed that from a human rights law perspective it is 
immaterial that the LoS only prescribes a duty to disembark the persons aboard to a place of 
safety in cases of Search and Rescue, but remains silent on this point in cases of interception. 
It is the presence of human rights jurisdiction which triggers the content and scope of human 




B. The content and scope of the prohibition of refoulement and collective expulsion 
under the ECHR system
79
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On 23 February 2012, the ECtHR rendered an important decision in the above mentioned 
Hirsi Jamaa case by settling that the prohibitions of refoulement and collective expulsion 
apply on the high seas ‘whenever a State through its agents exercise control and authority 
over an individual, and thus jurisdiction’.
80
 The discussion below limits itself to exploring the 
content and scope of these prohibitions as to assess their impact on the issue of 
disembarkation. It is argued that the obligations inherent to these prohibitions require 
disembarkation unto a safe territory. Although in theory disembarkation does not have to 
occur on EU territory, the current constellation in the Mediterranean suggests it should if it is 
to comply with human rights obligations. 
 
The complexity in applying the non-refoulement principle and prohibition of collective 
expulsion at sea lies in determining the precise scope of the State obligations and how these 
obligations can be observed in the maritime context. The distinction between negative and 
positive State obligations renders some useful insights in this regard. Put as a caricature, 
negative human rights obligations entail that the State refrains from certain actions (‘respect’), 
while positive human rights obligations demand certain State action and resources to ‘ensure’ 
the enjoyment of the right concerned.
81
 Within the category of positive State obligations, one 
can argue there exists a continuum in terms of efforts and resources a State should use in 
order to ensure a certain right is protected. Judicial review of required State action on this 
continuum is a delicate exercise.
82
 The ECtHR has specified certain aspects of the State 
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obligations inherent to the non-refoulement principle, as well as the prohibition of collective 
expulsion. 
 
The prohibition of refoulement is encapsulated in both refugee law and human rights law. 
Article 33, §1 of the Refugee Convention states that ‘no Contracting State shall expel or 
return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his 
life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership 
of a particular social group or political opinion.’
83
 Several international treaties
84
 create the 
obligation not to refoule individuals as a principle of international human rights law. The 
definition of who falls under the principle is thus not limited to refugees strictly speaking.
85
 
However, the scope of the protection afforded and whether exceptions are allowed differ 
from one human rights instrument to the other.
86
  The analysis below focuses on the 
prohibition of refoulement under Article 3 ECHR. 
 
Article 3 ECHR implies a clear negative obligation not to send migrants back to a place 
where they might be tortured or subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
Although this obligation could be formulated as a negative one – the State has to refrain from 
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a certain action – it also contains positive State obligations. Firstly, disembarkation in a third 
country may violate Article 3 ECHR ‘where substantial grounds have been shown for 
believing that the person in question, if expelled, would face a real risk of being subjected to 
treatment contrary to Article 3 in the receiving country.’
87
 Therefore State authorities 
exercising jurisdiction over migrants at sea have the obligation to assess this risk with 
reference to those facts which are known or should be known to the State at the time of 
removal.
88
 This examination should pertain to the foreseeable consequences upon removal ‘in 
the light of the general situation there as well as his or her personal circumstances.’
89
 It is up 
to the authorities to investigate proprio motu the treatment to which those rescued would be 
exposed if disembarked to a certain territory. The fact that the individual concerned does not 
expressly request asylum does not exempt a State from this obligation.
90
 Secondly, 
disembarkation to a third country may violate Article 3 ECHR when the State authorities can 
reasonably expect that this third country does not offer sufficient guarantees against arbitrary 
expatriation to a country where the individuals concerned may be at risk in the sense of 
Article 3 ECHR.
91
 Again, this requires the State authorities on the vessel to make an inquiry 
before disembarking persons rescued or intercepted. 
 
Collective expulsion is prohibited under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the ECHR
92
 and can – 
similar to Art 3 ECHR – apply extraterritorially, including on the high seas.
93
 The difference 
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between refoulement and collective expulsion mainly lies in the fact that in the case of 
refoulement, there exists a real risk for an individual to be persecuted
94
 or to be submitted to 
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment
95
 if he or she is returned, while the prohibition 




The prohibition of collective expulsion requires a detailed examination of the personal 
circumstances of aliens before their removal and an opportunity for every individual to put 
forward arguments against their expulsion.
97
 The Court implied in Hirsi that personnel 
trained to conduct individual interviews as well as the assistance of interpreters and legal 
advisers should be part of the applicable procedural guarantees.
98
 In Sharifi and others v. 
Italy and Greece, the Court also mentioned the importance of having information provided in 
a language that the individuals concerned can understand with the aim of informing them 




The latter passage on the Court’s observations in Sharifi might be interpreted as implying that 
the only way to satisfy Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 is to provide access to asylum 
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 Similarly, it has been argued that the non-refoulement principle also needs 
‘some form of refugee screening’.
101
 The OHCHR, UNHCR and several authors have argued 
that these obligations can only be complied with by checking every individual person for 
their potential status as a refugee or person otherwise in need of international protection, as 
all migrants should be treated under presumption of being in need of protection until proven 
otherwise.
102
 Although the ECtHR in Sharifi clearly drew a link between State practices of 
absence of information and access to asylum procedures in ports on the one hand, and 
collective expulsions and refoulement, on the other, it never stated that a subjective right to 
access asylum procedures flows from these prohibitions (see further below). Indeed, the 





Positive State obligations indeed become somewhat clearer when Article 3 ECHR and Article 
4 of Protocol No. 4 are read in conjunction with the right to an effective remedy pursuant to 
Article 13 ECHR.
104
 The latter stipulates that ‘everyone whose rights (…) are violated shall 
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have an effective remedy before a national authority (…).’
105
 The notion of ‘authority’ does 
not necessarily refer to a judicial authority.
106
 Submission to a national authority for scrutiny 
of an expulsion decision must have suspensive effect.
107
 The right to an effective remedy 
arguably also triggers a right to information and the right to legal and other assistance 
necessary to claim remedy.
108
 In practice, this obligation involves providing access to legal 
assistance and adequate interpretation to those under jurisdiction of the engaging State, as 
well as an obligation for State agents to inform the individuals concerned of the availability 
of a remedy. 
 
C. The effect on disembarkation  
As the ECtHR was able to ‘solve’ the Hirsi case by (merely) touching upon positive State 
obligations inherent to the prohibitions of refoulement and collective expulsion, the 
Strasbourg judges unfortunately did not clarify the issue of more extensive positive 
obligations, in general, and the aspect of access to asylum as a subjective right, in particular. 
In his separate Concurring Opinion, Judge Pinto de Albuquerque made a list of procedural 
safeguards inherent within the non-refoulement principle
109
 and stated that the Italian 
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Government ‘also [had] a positive obligation to provide the applicants with practical and 
effective access to an asylum procedure in Italy.’
110
 This line of thought which reads a right 
of access to asylum procedures into the prohibition of refoulement is contestable.
111
 While 
some authors, already mentioned above, argue that access to asylum procedures – and hence 
de facto disembarkation to the territory of asylum – is a necessary corollary of the non-
refoulement principle
112
, the Court – in my view – did not confirm this line of reasoning.
113
 
Despite this – what some will qualify as a restrictive – reading of the ECtHR case law, there 
are important implications regarding disembarkation.  
 
Firstly, the nature of the positive obligations inherent to the prohibitions of refoulement and 
collective expulsion as well as the right to an effective remedy arguably necessitate 
disembarkation onto land.
114
 Although the absence of compulsory access to courts may 
suggest that disembarkation to territory is not necessary, the other exigencies of Article 13 
suggest otherwise. While modern technologies may support some procedural aspects, overall 
living up to them on board a vessel at sea seems a daunting task: these requirements lie on the 
outer end of a continuum in terms of state resources as they require the State to have specially 
trained staff in place for registration and identification procedures, access to legal assistance 
and representation, a national instance for remedy, etc.
115
 This is especially a concern as the 
                                                 
110
 Judge Pinto de Albuquerque (n 109) 78. 
111
 Hathaway has clearly formulated how the duty not to refoule is distinct from a right to (access) asylum. J 
Hathaway, The rights of refugees in international law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2005) 300-302. 
How the right to asylum, which has its footing as a binding legal obligation in EU law, affects disembarkation is 
discussed further below in section 4. 
112
 M Giuffré, ‘Access to Asylum at Sea? Non-refoulement and a Comprehensive Approach to Extraterritorial 
Human Rights Obligations’, in V Moreno-Lax, E Papastavridis (eds), ‘Boat Refugees’ and Migrants at Sea: A 
Comprehensive Approach – Integrating Maritime Security with Human Rights (Brill, 2016) 255-61. 
113
 Cf. Mungianu (n 86) 168. 
114
 A recent study for the European Parliament affirms that screenings at sea are highly undesirable. See Guild, 
Costello, Garlick, Moreno-Lax, and Mouzourakis (n 102) 45-46. See also Dastyari (n 61) 168-69. 
115
 The Hirsi case is illustrative in this regard as it was apparent that the Italian maritime authorities were not 
trained or equipped to conduct interviews for every individual, nor was there legal assistance or interpretation 
available. Moreno-Lax (n 70), 589. UNHCR noted in this regard that ship captains of commercial vessels 
‘cannot be expected to make fine judgements as to the ‘safety’ in this ‘human rights’ sense of a proposed place 
of disembarkation. See UNHCR (n 21) 4, §17. See also IMO Guidelines (n 30), paragraph 6.1,0 which indicates 




suspensive effect of a remedy would create a situation in which migrants could be stuck at 
sea for days or longer. 
 
Secondly, the disembarkation may – in theory – occur somewhere else than on the territory of 
the State exercising jurisdiction at sea as long as it ensures that the State of disembarkation 
constitutes a territory where the migrants concerned are not at risk and where the necessary 
procedures mentioned above are in place.
116
 The current situation in the Mediterranean 
suggests that EU Member States – as parties to the ECHR – should accept disembarkation on 
to their territory in order to comply with the rules of the ECHR. Given that many off shore 
territories arguably cannot be designated as ‘safe’ in the sense of Article 3 ECHR, such as 
Tunisia, Libya or Egypt, and – even – Turkey,
117
 disembarkation onto the territory of an 
ECHR member State which exercises jurisdiction at sea seems almost inevitable. 
 
Thirdly, the rescued or intercepted migrants under the jurisdiction of a State bound by the 
abovementioned human rights instruments have a subjective right to these procedural 
guarantees. The disembarkation onto a safe territory where the above mentioned procedural 
rights can be guaranteed does not depend on the courtesy or good will of a coastal State, as is 
often the case under the Law of the Sea regime. A large influx of migrants does not justify 




IV. THE RIGHT TO ASYLUM UNDER THE CFR NECESSITATES DISEMBARKATION ON TO EU 
TERRITORY 
                                                                                                                                                        
that what can only be expected of the crew of the vessel is to collect information of those rescued with regard to 
name, age, gender, apparent health, medical condition etc. 
116
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The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (‘CFR’) also provides for the 
protection against refoulement (Art. 19(2)) and collective expulsion (Art. 19(1)). Both 
provisions correspond to the prohibitions discussed above under the Council of Europe 
instruments, their meaning and scope being the same.
119
 The CFR is a rare human rights 
instrument, however, in that it specifically stipulates a subjective right to asylum under 
Article 18. This right is given practical effect through a whole body of Regulations and 
Directives that are currently under reform. The contention here is that the EU acquis on 
border control can apply extraterritorially when EU Member States and agencies encounter 
migrants at sea, and that therefore Article 18 CFR – aside from Article 19 (§§1-2) – applies 
too when that acquis is implemented. The logical consequence is disembarkation onto EU 
territory in order to comply with the normative exigency to facilitate access to asylum 
procedures. 
 
A. Article 18 CFR creates a subjective right to access asylum procedures set up by the 
EU Member States 
Article 18 of the CFR states that ‘the right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for 
the rules of the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 
relating to the status of refugees and in accordance with the Treaty on European Union and 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union’.
120
 Although not creating an automatic 
right to be granted asylum, it requires EU Member States to guarantee a right to have an 
individual’s asylum application assessed and to grant asylum if the conditions are met.
121
 The 
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CJEU has confirmed the right to asylum pursuant to Article 18 to be a general principle of 
EU law.
122
 Secondary law has to comply with it and individuals can draw subjective rights 





Article 18 is given practical effect through the secondary legislation of the EU, more 
precisely via the asylum acquis. This body of law regulates, among other things, common 
standards for (access to) asylum procedures,
124
 common standards on who can qualify for 
international protection,
125
 and rules on how asylum seekers should be received.
126
 Another 
important instrument here is the Dublin Regulation,
127
 which is used to determine the EU 
Member State responsible for the processing of an asylum claim. In short, the acquis 
guarantees that asylum-seekers within its scope can access procedures to scrutinize their 
claims for international protection and – once recognized – can benefit from the rights that 
accompany them. 
 
B. The CFR, including Article 18, applies when EU law is being implemented 
extraterritorially  
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The CFR – and hence also the right to asylum – can apply extraterritorially, yet only in cases 
when the EU institutions, bodies, offices and agencies or EU Member States ‘are 
implementing Union law’.
128
 CFR obligations apply as a matter of EU constitutional 
obligation ‘without any additional IHRL jurisdictional criteria having to be met’.
129
 Indeed, 
there is no test of spatial or personal jurisdictional control like under international human 
rights law.
130
 What matters for the CFR is the law that governs a particular situation, namely 
EU law.
131
 This test thus potentially allows for a broader range of situations to fall under 
fundamental rights protection than under the ECHR as no effective control test is required.  
Applied to the context of rescue and interception at sea, the question therefore boils down to 
whether EU law is ‘being implemented’ in those particular circumstances. This is less 
obvious than one might think. There is no clear basis for extraterritorial border control in EU 
law,
132
 nor does the EU have competence to regulate on maritime search and rescue 
obligations. Is an EU Member State implementing EU law when pursuing a classic search 
and rescue action at sea? Is an EU Member State implementing EU law when patrolling 
beyond its territorial waters to prevent illegal entries and combat the smuggling of migrants? 
There are no clear answers to these questions, though both issues will be taken into 
consideration below. 
 
C. The EU acquis on border control and asylum can apply extraterritorially at sea, 
hence necessitating disembarkation on to EU territory to comply with Article 18 
CFR 
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The legal basis for legislative action in the field of border control and asylum can be found in 
Title V of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.
133
 Aside from being in 
accordance with the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, these 
secondary norms must also protect the right to asylum under the CFR. Procedural guarantees 
to access and lodge asylum claims in the context of border control are regulated through the 
Schengen Borders Code (SBC)
134
 and subsequently the secondary legislation constituting the 
CEAS. At first sight, a textual overview of the EU acquis on border control and asylum 
seems to indicate that its rules do not apply extraterritorially. However, it is argued below 
that (i) the SBC can apply extraterritorially, and that (ii) the rights guaranteed therein (and the 
acquis that gives effect to those rights) therefore should too. 
 
i. The border acquis can apply extraterritorially, including its safety clauses 
There are several indications that the SBC can apply extraterritorially. The SBC establishes 
rules on persons crossing the external borders of the EU Member States.
135
 From that very 
general provision one may infer that the SBC does not apply to migrants who do not even 
come near the external border,
136
 for example, on the high seas.  However, the SBC allows 
for special regimes of border control beyond the EU territory (for instance, in train stations 
and commercial marine routes and ports in third countries) under Article 19 SBC.
137
 A 2013 
amendment of the SBC introduced an explicit obligation for border guards from EU Member 
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States present at shared Border Crossing Points (BCPs) in third countries that ‘a third-country 
national asking for international protection on Member State territory shall be given access to 
relevant Member State procedures in accordance with the Union asylum acquis.’
138
 By way 
of analogy, when a State is operating at sea beyond its territorial waters checking for vessels 
with migrants on board, it is engaged in EU external border control. Overall, den Heijer’s 
observation is a case in point in that ‘the emerging logic is that, even though some 
definitional provisions of the Borders Code appear to locate the Schengen Border crossings 
regime ‘at’ the external border, the Code and related EU instruments are equipped with 




The border acquis contains several safety clauses. Article 3(b) of the Schengen Borders Code 
(SBC) stipulates that it applies ‘without prejudice to the rights of refugees and persons 
requesting international protection, in particular as regards non-refoulement’. Article 4 of the 
SBC states that EU Member States must fully comply with relevant EU law, including the 
CFR, and relevant international law, including the 1951 Refugee Convention.
140
 Arguably, 
those SBC provisions must be interpreted in light of the EU asylum acquis,
141
 particularly 
Article 6(5)(c) SBC which stipulates that Member States may authorise entry on 
humanitarian grounds or because of international obligations. In short, in the words of 
Moreno-Lax, ‘where activities covered by the Code take place, the guarantees enshrined 
therein are applicable as well.’
142
 From the moment the SBC applies extraterritorially, effect 
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must be given to the safeguard provisions mentioned above in general, and Article 18 CFR in 
particular. Consequently, it should therefore be made sure that access to asylum and 
procedural safeguards are explicitly provided for these types of scenarios at sea. The analysis 
below focuses on the EU legislation that exists to give effect to the guarantees mentioned in 
Articles 3 and 4 of the SBC: the asylum acquis. 
 
ii. The asylum acquis should be aligned with its potential extraterritorial application 
Articles 13 and 18 of the Qualification Directive (recast QD)
143
 oblige Member States to 
respectively grant refugee status and subsidiary protection for those who qualify. Access to 
lodge an application for international protection and procedural safeguards are provided by 
the Asylum Procedures Directive (recast APD).
144
 It lays down that rules to ensure access to 
asylum procedures and sets out important (procedural) safeguards.
145
 The recast APD also 
sets out minimum conditions for accelerated procedures
146
 as well as scrutiny tests for 
admissibility procedures.
147
 The Dublin III Regulation
148
 contains several procedural 
safeguards as well.
149
 The EU acquis thus provides a whole range of guarantees and 
safeguards for those migrants wanting to lodge an asylum-claim on EU territory. It, however, 
seems to fall short in providing protection beyond the external border of that territory.  
 
                                                 
143
 Recast QD (n 125). 
144
 Recast APD (n 124). 
145
 Access to asylum procedures (Article 6), the right to remain in the Member State pending examination 
(Article 9), a range of guarantees related to access to eg an interpreter, a legal adviser, and the UNHCR (Article 
12), a personal interview (Articles 14—17), the right to information (Article 19), the right to free legal 
assistance and representation in appeal (Art. 20), guarantees for persons with specific needs (Article 24) and 
unaccompanied minors (Article 25); see recast APD (n 124). 
146
 ‘In accordance with the basic principles and guarantees of Chapter II’, recast APD (n 124), Article 43. 
147
 Recast APD (n 124), Articles 33—39.  
148
 Dublin III Regulation (n 127). 
149
A right to information (Article 4), the right to a personal interview, with interpreter where necessary (Article 
5 (1) and (4)), written notification of transfer decisions
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court or tribunal (Article 27 (1)), Dublin III Regulation (n 127). 




The approach of the EU legislator in terms of the extraterritorial application of the asylum 
acquis at sea can be characterised as reticent. Under Dublin III, interception or rescue of 
migrants in the territorial waters of an EU Member State does not constitute a problem as 
this maritime zone is generally seen as part of a State’s territory. However, it is argued that 
Dublin III does not apply when persons are retrieved within maritime zones beyond the 
territorial sea and an application was initially made outside the territory.
150  Similarly, the 
APD limits its geographical scope to ‘all applications for international protection made in the 
territory, including at the border, in the territorial waters or in the transit zones of the Member 
States (…).’
151
 Unlike the Dublin III Regulation, this Directive does explicitly recognise its 
application to the territorial waters of a Member State. However, beyond the territorial sea the 
APD suffers from the same blind spot ratione loci by not covering claims made on the high 
seas. The field of application of the recast RCD is similarly territorially limited.
152
 
Interestingly, the recast QD contains no territorial delimitation. It has been argued that the 
territorial scope of the Qualification Directive is guided by the APD.
153
 Others have argued 





Despite the territorial limitations present in the texts of the EU asylum legislation, this acquis 
must apply and be accessible once it is established that the SBC applies in a situation at sea, 
as already argued above. Both the textual provisions and practice of the asylum acquis 
instruments should be aligned with this interpretation. One cannot enforce EU law while at 
the same time excising certain safeguards encapsulated therein, namely fundamental rights in 
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general, and the right to asylum pursuant to Article 18 CFR in particular. The necessary result 
is that, when Article 18 CFR applies at sea by virtue of the SBC that is ‘being implemented’, 
those persons under the jurisdiction of the EU Member State or agency in case should be 
disembarked onto EU territory for the purpose of being processed in accordance with the 





D. Article 18 CFR does not imply a right to access territory as such, but does so when 
EU law is being implemented and a sufficiently close link exists 
It is, however, contested within the literature whether Article 18 implies a right to access the 
territory of the asylum State:  
 
‘[It] is evident that several EU Member States have recognized asylum as an individual right in their 
constitutions. Therefore, it can be argued that if Article 18 of the EU Charter results from the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, it must be interpreted ‘in harmony’ with those 
traditions thus granting a right of entry which goes beyond protection against expulsion. Against this 
latter argument, it can be asserted that the Charter was not adopted with the intention of creating new 
rights but for the purposes of reaffirming rights resulting from national constitutional traditions and (…) 
international obligations common to the EU Member States. (…) Accordingly, Article 18 of the 
Charter should not be interpreted as an individual right of entry since such an interpretation does not 




First of all, it should be pointed out that the right to asylum received a separate stipulation in 
the CFR, different from the prohibition of refoulement and collective expulsion. If the 
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positive State obligations involved in Article 18 were to be explained similar to, for instance, 
Article 19 (2) CFR, why create a separate provision? The prohibitions under Article 19 (1) 
and (2) imply obligations similar to those discussed under the ECHR system, but not a 
subjective right to asylum as indicated in the case law of the ECtHR. Moreover, the fact that 
Article 18 mentions the 1951 Convention does not necessarily mean that its scope of 
obligations is limited to the non-refoulement obligations of that instrument, as a sort of 
exclusive renvoi;
157
  rather, it should ‘at a minimum’ observe the 1951 Convention.
158
 Article 
18 of the CFR encapsulates more than protection against refoulement, as it refers to the TEU 
and TFEU, which provide the legal basis for EU asylum acquis in order to materialise access 
to asylum procedures and the qualification and granting of asylum status in the EU Member 
States. 
 
Secondly, whether Article 18 implies a right to territorial access cannot be pursued in a legal 
and contextual vacuum. Standing on its own, one needs indeed to inquire whether States 
could have wanted the right to asylum in Article 18 to imply a right to access the asylum 
State from anywhere, or whether such an implied right would be necessary to render Article 
18 ‘practical and effective, not theoretical and illusory’. This would imply, for instance, that 
individuals could access embassies or consulates of the asylum State in third countries to 
claim a right to enter the EU territory with a view to accessing asylum procedures. It is not 
clear whether such a situation would constitute a ‘sufficient connection’, in line with the 
CJEU jurisprudence, to establish jurisdiction in the sense of Article 51(1) CFR. Hence, it is in 
doubt whether granting access to EU territory would be a Member State obligation under 
Article 18 of the Charter as such. The situation is, however, different when EU Member 
States and/or EU agencies actively engage migrants extraterritorially in a context in which 
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EU law and policy are pursued and implemented, in particular border control, combatting 
smuggling of migrants and trafficking of people. In those circumstances, there is arguably a 
clear link between the persons concerned and a body of EU law ‘being implemented’. 
Costello and Moreno-Lax have pointed out that the notion of implementation has been given 
a wide interpretation through the doctrine of effectiveness of EU law. One could argue that 
individual State operations at sea touch upon the migration and asylum policy and therefore 
are ‘connected in part to EU law’ and ‘affect the interests of the European Union’, criteria 
used in inter alia the Fransson case by the Luxembourg court to delineate the scope of the 
CFR.
159
 Moreover, the right to asylum would be rendered theoretical and illusory when the 
whole gist of pre-border control and surveillance permits the prevention of asylum-seekers 
and refugees from physically accessing and exercising their rights. 
 
E. Disembarkation and access to asylum under Regulation 656/2014 
An exception in the myriad of EU acquis is the Frontex Maritime Surveillance Regulation,
160
 
which applies only to the operational context in which Frontex (soon EBCGA) assists 
Member States. Its provisions echo almost the same language as that of the Strasbourg judges 
in Hirsi. This was the co-result of an annulment of Council Decision 2010/252/EU and 
academia, civil society and players such as UNHCR
161
 inserting themselves in the legislative 
process and trying to ensure that this new Regulation would be ‘Hirsi-proof’. As a result, 
interceptions and rescue at sea scenarios in which Frontex is involved are guided by explicit 
rules concerning non-refoulement and disembarkation. Recital 19 of the Regulation states that 
the regulation ‘respects’ and ‘observes’ the right to asylum, while recital 17 states that ‘[the] 
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operational plan should include procedures ensuring that persons with international protection 
needs (…) are identified and provided with appropriate assistance, including access to 
international protection.’ Nonetheless, there is no further explicit reference to the right to 
asylum pursuant to Article 18 CFR in the provisions of this Regulation, nor any operational 
article with a view to guaranteeing access to asylum in the EU once under CFR jurisdiction.  
The principle of non-refoulement receives a prominent place in Article 4 of the Frontex 
Maritime Surveillance Regulation. It stipulates that no person shall be disembarked in 
contravention of the non-refoulement principle. In order to do so, States need to ensure that 
an assessment of the general situation in third countries in that regard is part of the 
operational plan.
162
 This does not mean that migrants retrieved at sea will automatically be 
disembarked to safe EU territory grounds. Implicit in the language of paragraph 3 of Article 4 
is embedded the idea that participating units can still disembark migrants on non-EU territory. 
This is in line with our analysis that the prohibitions of refoulement and collective expulsion 
do not necessarily imply disembarkation on to the territory of the State which is exercising 
jurisdiction under the ECHR (see section 3 of this paper).  The only constraint stems from 
positive human rights obligations – as in Hirsi – in that before disembarking migrants on 
third country soil, the participating units have to identify the intercepted or rescued persons, 
assess their personal circumstances, inform them of their destination and give them an 





The second paragraph of Article 4(3) requires that operational plans must include ‘when 
necessary, the availability of shore-based medical staff, interpreters, legal advisers and other 
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relevant experts of the host and participating Member States.’
164
 This begs the question of 
how the shore-based capacities and services can be rendered practicable when it is decided to 
disembark on non-EU territory – i.e. a place where those very required capacities will not be 
present. These capacities allow satisfying the more demanding positive obligations that the 
non-refoulement principle arguably entails (see argument under section 3), but still only if 
disembarkation occurs in the EU territory where these capacities are present. In other words, 
when disembarkation occurs on the territory of a non-EU Member State this may still not be 
in conformity with the non-refoulement principle and a fortiori the right to asylum despite the 
efforts made in the Frontex Maritime Surveillance Regulation. 
 
A second pivotal provision in the Regulation is Article 10 which regulates disembarkation. 
Aside from carrying out the above mentioned non-refoulement exercise (with its identified 
dysfunctions included), the Regulation contemplates four disembarkation scenarios: 
 
- when interception takes place in the territorial sea or the contiguous zone, disembarkation shall 
take place in the coastal Member State (emphasis added); 
- when interception takes place on the high seas, disembarkation may take place in the third 
country from which the vessel is assumed to have departed, but if that is not possible 
disembarkation shall take place in the host Member State (emphasis added); 
- when a search and rescue takes place, the participating States shall then cooperate with the 
responsible SRR State to identify a place of safety
165
 for disembarkation. In case no solution is 
found for disembarkation in this scenario, disembarkation must take place in the host Member 
State. 
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- additionally, non-participating EU Member States can allow disembarkation on to their territory 
with their explicit (ad hoc) consent, but they cannot be forced to do so. 
 
This disembarkation scheme remedies an important gap that exists in the classic LoS 
framework for disembarkation: In case no proper disembarkation venue can be found, there is 
always a compulsory back up on EU soil to avoid standoffs and delays. These provisions, 
however, remain problematic given that scenarios two and three risk impeding migrants to 
exercise their subjective right to seek asylum on EU territory; a right that must be guaranteed 
in the context of Frontex-assisted missions as the law that applies in those situations is EU 
law and hence triggers the application of Article 18 CFR. 
 
V. CONCLUDING ANALYSIS 
A. The mosaic of norms affecting disembarkation 
Within the European context a complexity of norms is at play regarding the disembarkation 
of migrants. Under the Law of the Sea (LoS) there currently does not exist an obligation for 
States to accept the disembarkation of migrants onto their territory, nor does there exist a 
residual rule which allocates such responsibility when no venue for disembarkation can be 
found. It would be erroneous to conclude, however, that the LoS is unfit in terms of 
regulating disembarkations. The SAR and SOLAS Conventions describe clear responsibilities 
for coastal States and flag States to coordinate and cooperate to find a place for 
disembarkation and to have the appropriate mechanisms in place to that end.
166
 Rather, the 
problem lies with the European coastal States who are unable or unwilling to accept migrants 
within their territory. Therefore, this paper aimed at looking for normative guidance beyond 
the LoS to establish how disembarkation may be regulated. As the underlying problem is not 
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one of maritime policy but one of border controls and asylum, the problem should be guided 
by the relevant human rights law and EU acquis.  
 
Complying with the full scope of human rights obligations under the ECHR instruments 
necessitates the disembarkation onto land when migrants are under the ECHR jurisdiction of 
a Contracting Party. This land should, however, not necessarily be EU territory when 
migrants are intercepted or rescued on the high seas: under the ECHR, access to asylum 
procedures and courts are not an absolute requisite to fulfil the procedural guarantees of 
Article 13 ECHR. A third country is arguably suitable for disembarkation as long as 
procedures similar to the standards of Article 13 juncto Article 3 ECHR and Article 4 of 
Protocol No. 4 can be complied with. With the exception of one judge, the Grand Chamber in 
Hirsi did not – arguably rightly so – touch upon the issue of the precise positive State 
obligations arising from the prohibition on refoulement and collective expulsion in an 
extraterritorial context, in particular an implied right to asylum and access to territory. 
 
The situation is different when migrants find themselves beyond the territorial waters of an 
EU Member State, but in a situation in which EU law is being implemented: once a migrant 
is engaged at sea by EU Member States authorities (in their individual capacity
167
 or in the 
framework of a Frontex-assisted mission) or an EU agency in the framework of border 
control operations, he or she should be given access to international protection procedures 
pursuant to Article 18 CFR. This necessitates disembarkation on to EU territory and not 
merely on to a safe territory of a third country as – in theory – could be the case under the 
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prohibitions of refoulement and collective expulsion under the ECHR system and Article 19 
(1-2) of the CFR. 
 
A brief scrutiny of the EU acquis reveals a reluctance to regulate access for migrants to 
European soil and international protection mechanisms. Although secondary legislation 
creates extensive procedural safeguards for asylum-seekers and refugees, these mechanisms 
are reserved for those who are able to make it to EU territory or to a place at its external 
borders. Absent a clear rule which obliges EU Member States to allow the migrants it 
engages on the high seas to lodge an asylum claim within its territory, there is arguably a 
situation of non-alignment between the EU acquis and the CFR. 
 
The translation of fundamental rights into a protection-friendly external border practice is a 
challenge for the EU,
168
 this despite policy commitments made at the highest political level 
on ‘facilitating access and improving security’
169
 and ‘enhancing legal avenues to Europe’
170
. 
Absent clear binding European norms, it will be up to the ECtHR or CJEU to embark upon 
this sensitive topic and settle the issue of access to protection in the extraterritorial context 
and hence also the issue of disembarkation.
171
 As the problem of disembarkation is also one 
of policy, this concluding analysis considers a few elements that may incentivise States to 
create legal and practical solutions for disembarkation, taking some of the pressure and 
expectations away from the court system. 
 
B. Can disembarkation be made acceptable through burden-sharing? 
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It is not the first time that large influxes of migrants and refugees create challenges. Burden-
sharing was successfully applied in some historical cases,
172
 while in others it remained stuck 
at the policy level.
173
 Elements of burden-sharing may increase the willingness of EU coastal 
States to accept disembarkations of migrants, although recent developments have provided us 
with a reality check as we move on to contemplate possible solutions. Incentives may be 
provided with regard to three problem areas for coastal States: overburdened disembarkation 
venues, overburdened processing capacity, and an overburdened share of asylum-seekers. 
 
A first component of burden-sharing could lie in spreading disembarkations over different 
safe ports along the EU external border. This would alleviate over-burdened smaller ports 
and islands close to popular routes for overseas crossings, which are mainly situated in 
Greece and the southern coasts of Italy. This could be operationalised through pre-established 
lists of safe ports which are provided by the EU coastal States.  
 
A similar system of a list of ‘places of refuge for vessels’ already exists in the sphere of 
marine environment protection. Article 20 of Directive 2002/59/EC requires coastal States to 
identify safe ports for receiving vessels in distress in order to protect human life and the 
marine environment.
174
 Its system practically runs on specialised authorities and is 
incentivised by financial compensations for allowing disembarkation.
175
 In terms of decision 
making, the appointed authorities have an obligation to allow disembarkation to a place of 
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refuge ‘if they consider such an accommodation the best course of action for the purposes of 




Aside from the political hurdles, the concern that a journey to a port further down the 
European coastline would be impracticable can be refuted. French, Spanish or Portuguese 
ports or ports further down the Italian, Croatian or Slovenian coast could be reached between 
ten to twenty-four hours, depending on the vessel. There has even been one instance in which 
a Danish container ship picked up migrants off the coast of Sicily and disembarked them in 
Felixstowe, England.
177
Although merchant vessels might be less flexible than State vessels, a 
larger pre-established list may actually accommodate more flexibility in terms of venues for 
disembarkation. Major European coastal cities could play a role in this. 
 
Coastal States other than Italy and Greece will, however, be reluctant to participate in a port-
sharing scheme. To increase the incentives for acceptance, a second important element of 
burden-sharing may lie in de-linking disembarkation duties from the identification and 
registration of migrants on the one hand, and the full responsibility to process asylum 
applications on the other hand. This idea has already been proposed by UNHCR
178
 and 
explored by inter alia Di Filippo, who argues that it could be implemented in accordance 
with the Dublin III Regulation.
179
 This de-linking has also been used in the Gulf of Aden, 
where, with the involvement of UNHCR, migrants were disembarked in Djibouti and 
processed in Ethiopia.
180
 Applied to the European context, UNHCR and EASO-assisted 
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processing could - to varying degrees
181
 - be expanded to other safe ports along the EU coast, 
taking away pressure from the currently overcrowded so-called hotspots, while schemes of 
relocation – again with the support of UNHCR and EASO – could be used to share the 
burden of taking in qualified asylum-seekers. Return schemes for those not qualifying for 
international protection could also be organised from these venues with the assistance of the 
EBCGA, EASO, and IOM. 
 
C. Current practice and reforms: the EU-Turkey Statement and beyond 
i. State practice in the Mediterranean: the EU-Turkey Statement 
The recent EU-Turkey Statement
182
 and its implementation are an example of how burden-
sharing techniques can negatively affect the rights of migrants.  
 
Firstly, the disembarkation and subsequent reception of migrants is mostly limited to the 
hotspots, leading to high concentrations of people on a limited amount of islands. The Greek 
Law 4375/2016
183
 now foresees that all third country nationals and stateless persons 
irregularly entering the Greek territory are led to Reception and Identification Centres (RICs) 
where they are automatically detained.
184
 These overcrowded de facto detention centres, risk 
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Secondly, regarding ‘sharing migrants’ as a burden sharing element, the EU has turned away 
from using intra-EU relocation for all maritime arrivals as of 20
th
 of March 2016 onwards.
186
 
Instead, all new maritime irregular arrivals from Turkey to Greece are to be returned to 
Turkey according to the EU-Turkey Statement. Irregular migrants not applying for asylum 
will be returned. Those migrants who do apply for asylum are being subjected to an 
‘exceptional border procedure’
187
 in which the Safe Third Country (STC) and First Country 
of Asylum (FCA) concepts pursuant to Article 33 APD are used to render asylum-claims on 
EU territory inadmissible.
188
 According to Greek law, these expulsions are based on 
individual assessments and with respect to the necessary rights and procedural safeguards.
189
 
Nonetheless, there is a high risk that both Syrians and non-Syrians disembarked on the Greek 
islands are being returned to Turkey in violation of the criteria and safeguards laid down in 
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By trying to remove asylum-seekers and refugees under the STC and FCA concepts instead 
of assessing asylum-claims on their substance, the EU has found a way to return migrants en 
masse under the pretext of legality under the EU asylum acquis. As a form of compensation, 
for every Syrian readmitted to Turkey, one Syrian is supposed to be resettled to the EU under 
the ‘one for one’ scheme. The amount of resettlements under this scheme remains low, both 
compared to the number of pledges so far (2217 out of a total of 11228 pledges)
191
 and 
compared to the hypothetical amount of asylum-seekers that arguably could have reached 




ii. The CEAS reform 
On 6 April 2016, the European Commission announced a reform of the Common European 
Asylum System (CEAS), inter alia with a view to ‘improve safe and legal avenues to the 
EU’.
193
 These reforms form an opportunity to remedy the existing flaws with regard to the 
protection and safe disembarkation of migrants at sea pointed out in this article. On 4 May 
2016, the EC proposed reforming the Dublin Regulation which would contain a corrective 
allocation mechanism to share the burden of asylum-applications among the Member States 
‘in situations when a Member State is confronted with a disproportionate number of 
applications for international protection for which it is the Member State responsible under 
the Regulation’.
194
 This mechanism may especially be significant to lessen the burden of the 
coastal States Italy and Greece in terms of ‘sharing migrants’, yet has proven to be a 
contested issue.  
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Additionally, the EC also released a set of further reform proposals on 13 July 2016, 
including of the recast APD which will be transformed into an Asylum Procedures 
Regulation (APR).
195
 Certain elements should be taken into consideration with regard to the 
latter.  
 
Firstly, two remarks should be made regarding the physical access to asylum after 
interception or rescue at sea following the triggering of Article 18 CFR and the asylum acquis. 
On the one hand, the APR proposal now explicitly stipulates that State officials at their own 
initiative have to ask the persons concerned whether they wish to receive international 
protection,
196
 thereby aligning itself with the ECtHR jurisprudence in Hirsi as set out above. 
On the other hand, the new APR should moreover provide an express provision which 
facilitates access to asylum procedures when under the jurisdiction of an EU Member States 
at sea. Currently, Article 3 of the recast APD foresees that it only applies to applications 
made ‘in the territory, including at the border, in the territorial waters or in the transit zones 
of Member States’.
197
 The proposed new Article 2(1) APR does not change anything in this 
regard.  
 
Secondly, the lowering of certain standards in the APR proposal may affect access to 
protection in the EU territory and thus the disembarkation question in the longer run. The 
new APR consolidates the paradigm established under the EU-Turkey Agreement regarding 
the application of the First Country of Asylum and Safe Third Country concepts. While under 
the recast APD the application of these concepts is optional (‘may’), the APR proposal makes 
them a compulsory step. Not only are these concepts controversial from an international 
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 their automatic application in the maritime context may lead to a 
practice in which only a very limited procedure
199
 is followed compared to access to a 
substantive asylum procedure for those rescued or intercepted. While the latter clearly 
requires disembarkation on to land (i.e. EU territory), it may be a future development in EU 
policy to have admissibility procedures take place within territories of third States,
200





Awaiting new jurisprudence on the extraterritoriality of the right to asylum and the enactment 
of EU norms on physical access to international protection, durable disembarkation solutions 
in the Mediterranean with due respect for the subjective rights of migrants are very limited. 
This way the proper realization of human rights of migrants seeking to reach Europe by sea 
remains adrift. 
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